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Abstract:
The article deals with how victims respond to the situation of victimization by “speaking” or the 
politics of articulation. It touches on the role of the social order in the creation of torture as a means 
to achieve control and the role of victims who inadvertently become accomplices to victimization in 
a system “that makes men torture and imprison innocent people.” The paper also examines the nu-
ances of the word “speaking” and its deeper connotations in terms of resistance to an unjust order. 
Victims are as complex as the phenomena of victimization. Therefore an interdisciplinary perspec-
tive is essential to understand what the speaking of the victim means; that is the perspective I used 
to make my point about the victim who in the process of speaking ceases to be a victim. 
Keywords: victims, speech, silence, resistance 
Resumo:
Este artigo incide sobre o modo como as vítimas respondem à situação de vitimização através da 
«fala» ou sobre uma política de articulação. Aborda o papel da ordem social na criação da tortura 
como meio de alcançar o controlo e o papel das vítimas que inadvertidamente se tornam cúmplices 
da vitimização num sistema «que faz com que os homens torturem e prendam pessoas inocentes». 
O artigo examina igualmente as nuances da palavra «fala» e as suas conotações mais profundas em 
termos de resistência face a uma ordem injusta. As vítimas são tão complexas quanto o fenómeno 
de vitimização. Por esse motivo, uma perspectiva interdisciplinar é essencial para compreender o 
significado do acto de falar da vítima; essa é a perspectiva aqui seguida para sustentar a minha visão 
sobre o modo como a vítima deixa de ser vítima durante o processo de «fala». 
Palavras-chave: vítimas, fala, silêncio, resistência 
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That victim who is able to articulate the situation of the victim has ceased to be a victim: he, or 
she, has become a threat. (James Baldwin, The Devil Finds Work)
Even now my voice is reaching millions throughout the world, millions of despairing men, wo-
men and little children, victims of a system that makes men torture and imprison innocent people. 
To those who can hear me I say “Do not despair”. (Charlie Chaplin, The Great Dictator)
I. A “threat” called the victim
The victim that speaks is a threat. The victim that does not speak is in the process 
of going insane. The victim that does not know she/he is a victim is half-dead and living 
the life of a vegetable. But, the word “victim” like “outsider” is a dubious term and hard 
to distinguish from another as complicated term “accomplice.” Sartre says that “the mo-
ment of pleasure for the torturer is that in which the victim betrays or humiliates himself” 
(403). Self-betrayal defines the victim before anything else. Since betrayal as a word 
carries within its semantic framework a betrayal of oneself, the torturer is the tortured and 
the victimizer an always already victim. Fanon in the chapter “Colonial War and Mental 
Disorders” from The Wretched of the Earth discusses the case of “A European police ins-
pector who tortured his wife and children” (267). This man was used to torturing Algerian 
prisoners and would not hesitate to hit his wife and “even the baby of twenty months, with 
unaccustomed savagery” (268). Fanon thus concludes the case:
This man knew perfectly well that his disorders were directly caused by the 
kind of activity that went on inside the rooms where interrogations were car-
ried out, even though he tried to throw the responsibility totally upon “present 
troubles.” As he could not see his way to stopping torturing people (that made 
nonsense to him for in that case he would have to resign) he asked me without 
beating about the bush to help him to go on torturing Algerian patriots without 
any prickings of conscience, without any behavior problems, and with complete 
equanimity. (268-270) 
Fanon observes that there is no escaping the consequences of torture, certainly not 
for the torturer. The violence of a man in the outside world is bound to have repercus-
sions on how he behaves at home with his family. A man cannot be as schizophrenic as 
to be violent with the rest of the world and yet be a normal family person. Violence can 
be addictive as a form of power and once a man is used to it he requires a regular dosa-
ge of violence to keep him functional in the same way that an alcoholic needs alcohol 
to feel that he could be himself outside the domain of contradictions in which he lives 
and acts out his personhood on a day to day basis. From an attitude, violence has a way 
of becoming synonymous with one’s nature. The police inspector did not want to stop 
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torturing people. All he wanted was to behave “normally” with his family and “without 
any prickings of conscience.” Speaking of the “cruel bond between physical pain and 
interrogation,” Scarry says in “The transformation of body into voice,” “Just as interro-
gation, like the pain, is a way of wounding, so the pain, like the interrogation, is a vehicle 
of self-betrayal” (46-47). The pain is physical and psychological for the victim but for the 
victimizer it is more about dealing with an abstract condition called normalcy. The latter 
has to bind those threads that give one’s personhood a sense of wholeness; in the absence 
of the wholeness a man shows all the signs of confused reactions to the slightest provoca-
tion. The inspector in Fanon’s case was worried about “behavior problems” that he could 
not deal with which were in fact symptoms of a deeper malaise rooted in his personhood 
derived from a colonial racist framework.  
More importantly the question that needs to be asked is what happens to the mind of 
a victim when the “pain” turns her/him into a “vehicle of self-betrayal.” At what point 
does the victim become an accomplice and at what point does the accomplice decide to 
speak and stop being a victim – that is the question! Is it nobler in the mind to suffer the 
slings and arrows of humiliation and despair or take arms against self-deception and nai-
vety and by opposing end them? Or something better – to die or sleep and forget that the 
whole thing happened! The role of memory in victimization especially for the victim can 
hardly be minimized. The thought of having gone through avoidable pain where one had 
the choice to say ‘no’ is what makes being victimized a difficult thing to accept. Scarry 
mentions that, “For what the process of torture does is to split the human being into two…
The goal of the torturer is to make the one, the body, emphatically and crushingly present 
by destroying it, and to make the other, the voice, absent by destroying it” (48-49). 
The destruction of the body and the voice that argues for the integrity of the body 
must be understood in the larger context of torture in relation to entities such as the state. 
Violence has a strangely impersonal quality to it; the capacity for violence automatically 
dies where there is no soil to nurture it on a daily basis. Theories of men being innately 
violent are thus innately flawed because they do not contextualize individual behavior. 
The torturer experiences the splitness of his own body before he splits the body of the vic-
tim. He cannot be himself, as in a self that reflects and feels the body of another person as 
if it were her own. In the absence of an instinctive empathy a distance is created between 
one’s body and the ability to perceive oneself as a body. Through this splitness the victi-
mizer achieves the status of a victim and psychologically becomes what he is physically 
not. In an almost haunting manner, the victim in oneself is one’s always already other. 
“Here’s the smell of the blood still” (Act V Scene I) says Lady Macbeth in her madness 
that Shakespeare movingly shows as the plight of the victimizer. Such an impersonality 
that torture demands but whose consequences can only be personal, as in the case of the 
police inspector that Fanon talks about, is embodied in the functioning of the state. As 
Lazreg argues, 
222
The vicTim ThaT speaks is noT a vicTim
The Algerian case reveals that the democratic state is in constant danger of 
allowing its predemocratic core to emerge and engage in violations of laws 
guaranteeing civil liberties, the sanctity of the person, and due process. It also 
reveals the fragility of the democratic state when it operates as a colonial insti-
tution and finds itself defending the privileges of colonists over and against the 
rights of its native citizens qua subjects. (253)
At one level it is too simple to view the “victim” as a facet of the victimizer. At ano-
ther level, it is necessary to note that impersonal and larger forces or contexts are play-
grounds where individual and personal feelings act out an internalized social logic of how 
we treat people at the receiving end of power. It is at those points that it becomes difficult 
to draw the line between victims and victimizers. Feelings of resentment towards oneself 
and others – who, we falsely assume, have escaped what we’ve been through – are natural 
to one’s situation. Bitterness needs an ally for it to thrive or it kills the embittered like a 
parasite feeding on the body and mind that produced it. Sometimes it needs another being 
to play the role of a victim – a role that it is tired of performing. For a change it wants to 
be a victimizer to experience something different. History offers instances where victims 
have had no problems turning into victimizers. In the article “From victims to victimizers: 
on the “mass psychology” of Israel” the sociologist Lauren Langman notes:
Fear and insecurity is constantly reinforced by the all pervasive domination of 
the Shoah (holocaust) in everyday life-especially by elites who use the Shoah 
and “never again” as rallying calls for their every political initiative. The result 
of this fear, located within a hegemonic ideological matrix shaded by the Holo-
caust, has shaped the “mass psychology” of Israel. (6)
The accomplice that used speech to free herself/himself has no qualms in suppressing 
the possibilities of speech in a victim. Having been a victim once, you are aware of the 
nuances of speaking and therefore the suppression is much more subtle and effective. In 
the case of the state of Israel every possible attempt was used to make historic victimi-
zation of Jews in Western Civilization the basis for an aggressive, victimizing attitude 
towards Palestinians. Langman posits that the need to victimize comes from a feeling of 
insecurity reinforced through ideology. He extends the argument to show the American 
over-reaction in the case of the 9/11 attack, a reaction at once irrational and thus one that 
is ready to accept the blatant lies of the government and the corporate media. 
For example, shortly after 9/11, most American feared another terrorist attack, 
and in turn, they rallied around W and tolerated little dissent from the “received 
wisdom”- especially when the wisdom they received told them that Saddam 
Hussein was behind 9/11, he had WMDs and was about to use them against 
the US. (5)
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However one may explain the vicious cycle of victims turning victimizers using his-
torical instances, this could never be an excuse for victimizing in the first place and at all 
times the point of view of the victim needs to be given due consideration. Such a point of 
view makes sense when we begin to look at the contexts of repression. To prevent speech 
is another way of taking away the personhood of the person. But, speech has a way of co-
ming out into the open; the speaking victim drops every other mask to come out with the 
face of utter emptiness, the vacuum, the blank, the cipher that will drain the energy and 
passion of the victimizer, bring the latter out of his/her nostalgia for a time when things 
were simpler and meaningful, force him/her to become more vicious than he/she could 
dream of being, and make him/her confront the same pointlessness that is the essence of 
being a victim.
The point in the victim knowing that she/he is a victim is that she/he breaks a man-
-made limit. Speaking of “The Price of Dignity” with reference to the Palestinians who 
are imprisoned and tortured, Kim Bullimore observes that 
While the Israeli state and its military machine may break the bones and tear 
the flesh of its captives, it will fail to break their resistance because these young 
boys, men and women understand the struggle in which they are engaged is not 
just a struggle for a homeland, but a struggle for human dignity, equality and 
freedom. And no man or woman or child, no matter how hard pressed by their 
oppressor, will ever give up the struggle for such basic and inalienable human 
rights. (Bullimore)
The struggle for “human dignity, equality and freedom” is an existential need and 
Faulkner in his Nobel Prize Acceptance Speech says that “man” is immortal not just be-
cause he will “endure” but more because “when the last dingdong of doom has clanged 
and faded from the last worthless rock hanging tideless in the last red and dying evening, 
that even then there will still be one more sound: that of his puny inexhaustible voice, still 
talking.” The “puny inexhaustible voice” that will “talk” to the very end is owing to the 
fact that it will never “give up the struggle for such basic and inalienable human rights.” 
Short of remaining silent except as a strategy to fight, the victim will think of every pos-
sible means to preserve her humanity.
The victim that knows how to swear and curse is not a victim. “Cursed be I that did 
so!” says Caliban for having shown Prospero “all the qualities o’ the isle, / The fresh 
springs, brine-pits, barren place and fertile” in exchange for “Water with berries in’t, and 
teach me how / To name the bigger light, and how the less, / That burn by day and night: 
and then I loved thee” (Act I Scene 2). Caliban is no fool and yet all he can do is curse 
himself for having given away the island in exchange for “how to name.” The language 
of the victimizer has given Caliban nothing more than the power to curse and swear. 
Caliban’s consciousness of his state of being a victim is itself a moment of liberation. It 
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is a prelude both to resistance and transformation of one’s condition. Frederick Douglass 
in The Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass: An American Slave eloquently speaks 
of the suffering that knowledge brought him; once he could “read” he more and more felt 
the pain of slavery imposed on him depriving him of his humanity. Says Douglass with 
an almost feverish intensity:
I would at times feel that learning to read had been a curse rather than a bles-
sing. It had given me a view of my wretched condition, without the remedy. It 
opened my eyes to the horrible pit, but to no ladder upon which to get out. In 
moments of agony, I envied my fellow-slaves for their stupidity. I have often 
wished myself a beast. I preferred the condition of the meanest reptile to my 
own. Any thing, no matter what, to get rid of thinking! It was this everlasting 
thinking of my condition that tormented me. (54)
Yet it is the anger and the pain of being enslaved that made it possible for Frederick 
Douglass to resist an inhuman condition called slavery. The victim that dies dreaming of 
freedom is not a victim. To keep the idea of freedom alive – that’s the historic destiny of 
the oppressed individual and groups. The most dangerous of all victims is the one that 
is silent. You cannot be silent for the sake of silence. You can be silent because you’re 
overwhelmed by the situation. If it’s joy it’s joy, if pain it’s the pain, if anger – an anger 
that is unbearable to the extent that it has an eerie silence to it! The silence that comes 
from anger is the most profound of all silences. No one knows the eyes of a victim like the 
victim herself/himself. The drama of the eyes – the victim has perfected the look through 
sleepless nights and dark days. It’s the drama of changing facial lines that we see among 
the blind; the strange movement of lips and the attempt to listen with the eyes that we see 
among the deaf and the dumb. The victim exists in a vacuum outside her/his conscious 
life responding in a Pavlovian manner to an unconscious force generating feelings and 
thoughts that might come as surprise to the victim herself/himself. What we know of the 
victim as a contribution to “knowledge” outside the framework of power relations can 
only be a superficial one.  
Remember the stunning scene at the end of Orwell’s 1984: “He gazed up at the enor-
mous face. Forty years it had taken him to learn what kind of smile was hidden beneath the 
dark moustache. O cruel, needless misunderstanding! O stubborn, self-willed exile from 
the loving breast! Two gin-scented tears trickled down the sides of his nose. But it was 
all right, everything was all right, the struggle was finished. He had won the victory over 
himself. He loved Big Brother.” Orwell’s insight that human will can be broken down under 
torture is a real one for the majority of humanity. The fear of hurt and humiliation works 
as significantly as ideology in perpetrating violence of the worst kind. The Human Rights 
Watch World Report 2011 records how “threats” could be sufficient to break the will of 
common people who would rather stay away from violence than openly confront it.
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Threats alone can be very effective in shutting down schools in environments 
where violence is widespread and perpetrators go unpunished. A teacher in ru-
ral Laghman province, Afghanistan, told Human Rights Watch that a third of 
her students dropped out after a so-called “night letter” was left at the mosque, 
which stated: “We warn you to stop sending your girls to these classes or you 
cannot imagine the consequences. Your classes will be blown up by a bomb, 
or if any of your daughters is raped or kidnapped, you cannot complain later 
on.” (40)
The human cunning for survival as resistance is not to be dismissed though. A person 
will wear a million masks before he or she knows for a fact that power is in their hands 
which is why betrayals often come as terrible surprise. The betrayer knows what he or 
she/he is getting at. She/he has planned those countless moves before the coup de grace. 
How do we know for a fact that Mr. Smith has not planned those tears and that “victory 
over himself” in the dark recesses of the unconscious! The tragedy of power in its “naked” 
forms is that it succumbs to its own illusions, the reason being that it does not achieve its 
target of acquiring the genuine consent of its victims. Bertrand Russell says “Power is 
naked when its subjects respect it solely because it is power, and not for any other reason” 
(75). Having lost the ability to exist except in a state of nakedness, such a power is bound 
to diminish sooner rather than later. In his pamphlet “The meaning of Birmingham” the 
civil rights activist Bayard Rustin warns: “The Negro masses are no longer prepared to 
wait for anybody; not for elections, not to count votes, not to wait on the Kennedys or for 
legislation, nor, in fact, for Negro leaders themselves. They are going to move. Nothing 
can stop them from moving. And if that Negro leadership does not move rapidly enough 
and effectively enough they will take it into their own hands and move anyhow” (111). 
Where the resistance has determined to “move” no matter what, power cannot thrive in 
such an atmosphere. Therefore, the logic of inevitable failure is built into the exercise of 
power. When Macbeth says “There’s nothing serious in mortality: / All is but toys” (Act 
II Scene III), it is but an honest recognition of the limitations of power. The tragedy of 
power is finally that of the “poor player / That struts and frets his hour upon the stage / 
And then is heard no more” (Act V Scene V).
II. Speech and its Discontents
James Scott in Weapons of the Weak speaks of a different type of a “victim” – the 
victim who knows how to fight back; the victim that’ll use every means at her/his disposal 
to fight the world that has unfairly pushed her/him into a situation of subservience; in this 
case it’s the “peasant.” The changes in technology are a blessing to the new order; but 
the older values suit the interests of the poor peasant for no other reason except that he or 
she has more to gain from those values in an unequal system. The landless peasant has to 
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negotiate in a nuanced language with the new order using the older values as a base. In the 
chapter “History according to winners and losers” Scott makes the following observation:
If it is true that events are not self-explanatory, that they do not speak for them-
selves, it is also, alas, true that human subjects do not entirely speak for them-
selves. If they did, it would suffice merely to turn on the tape recorder and offer 
a complete transcript to the reader. This social-scientist-as-recorder technique 
has been tried with illuminating results, most notably by what might be called 
the “Oscar Lewis school of anthropology.” Even Oscar Lewis, however, has 
found it necessary to arrange and edit the transcript and to add a preface or 
postscript. The necessity arises, I believe, for at least three reasons. First, the 
human subjects themselves often speak with a kind of linguistic shorthand with 
similes and metaphors that they have no need to clarify to their neighbors but 
that would, without explanation, mystify an outsider. (138-139) [my italics]
Scott’s central point that “human subjects do not entirely speak for themselves” is 
paradoxically true because so much of what is said is by way of implication rather than 
adding words to words and more words. One can only speak partially of oneself. In any 
dialogue including the Socratic with a tendency to lead to a conclusion at once unexpec-
ted and as logically determined as a Sherlock Holmes mystery, it is the context that shapes 
the meanings of words. Contexts, by default, have a tendency to be interpretations. That’s 
how for instance the word “sceptre” is used twice by Portia to defend the cause of a man’s 
life in Shakespeare’s The Merchant of Venice. It does not make an appeal to the law and 
justice; it makes an appeal to the vulnerabilities of human condition greater than the law 
and outside the scope of a demand for justice. Portia appeals to the “quality of mercy” 
which is “the throned monarch better than his crown.” What Portia does is to place the 
question of power in an existential humanist context. Do we understand power as a way 
to inspire “dread and fear” or as a way to break barriers imposed upon us by social and 
economic conditions? The politics of mercy is about creating bonds of friendship where 
there are none. Thus Portia says of the true monarch:   
His sceptre shows the force of temporal power,
The attribute to awe and majesty,
Wherein doth sit the dread and fear of kings;
But mercy is above this sceptred sway;
It is enthroned in the hearts of kings, 
It is an attribute to God himself;
And earthly power doth then show likest God’s
When mercy seasons justice. (Act IV Scene I) 
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The scepter is a symbol of power “Wherein doth sit the dread and fear of kings” but 
there is a creative misreading that could turn the dread and fear into its opposite. A power 
that comes from authority could only be “temporal” connected to earth and time. Real 
power like real strength is the ability to show mercy because the claims to justice are not 
infinite. By attributing infinity to the quality of mercy, Portia expands the scope of the 
symbol beyond what is normally implied taking the sceptre from “temporal power” to the 
eternal, from the hand that holds the sceptre straight to the heart – the seat of compassion 
and from devastating anger to boundless forgiveness. Further, the metaphor marches out-
side the domain of the human into the discourse of the divine becoming an “attribute to 
God himself.” 
Like the peasant of Sedaka in Scott’s book, Portia uses an older value to defend a 
man’s life in a system and against a law that is new. Nothing serves the context more 
than a subtle use of the metaphor to include meanings hitherto concealed. Thus Portia 
continues to make her appeal to the humanity of the affronted party in the spirit of English 
Humanism:
   Therefore, Jew, 
Though justice be thy plea, consider this, 
That, in the course of justice, none of us 
Should see salvation: we do pray for mercy; 
And that same prayer doth teach us all to render 
The deeds of mercy. I have spoke thus much 
To mitigate the justice of thy plea; 
Which if thou follow, this strict court of Venice 
Must needs give sentence ‘gainst the merchant there. (Act IV Scene I)
The same sceptre is the source of the power to sentence a person to death and a power 
to show mercy. In the latter kind of power the sceptre is symbolic of something greater 
than “earthly power.” The textuality of Portia’s argument is constituted through a clever 
understanding of “differences” that Derrida speaks of in the essay “Plato’s Pharmacy.” 
The word pharmakon is both remedy and poison – the cure is in the illness, the silence in 
the sound, the metaphor is a prisoner of the literal and what is considered as absence is a 
hallmark of presence.
When a word inscribes itself as the citation of another sense of the same word, 
when the textual center-stage of the word pharmakon, even while it means re-
medy cites, re-cites, and makes legible that which in the same word signifies, 
in another spot and on a different level of the stage, poison (for example, since 
that it not the only other thing pharmakon means), the choice of only one of 
these renditions by the translator has as its first effect the neutralization of the 
citational play, of the “anagram,” and, in the end, quite simply of the very tex-
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tuality of the translated text…Textuality being constituted by differences and 
by differences from differences, it is by nature absolutely heterogeneous and is 
constantly composing with the forces that tend to annihilate it.  (98)
The permutations and combinations of meanings are rooted in the context. The user 
of language plays on latent possibilities. Therefore, my expression of myself as a self can 
only be a partial one. The “linguistic shorthand” of the human subject is how language 
functions in day to day life. The nature of speech is that we suggest more than what we 
say. The victim turns the suggestion into a language in itself and makes the shorthand 
into an art form and a way of life. That’s how the poor in Sedaka have manufactured their 
“weapons” despite being “weak.” The discontents of speech are at the level of suggestion 
where meanings are relative and in a fluid state but that is where the victim can blow the 
trumpet signifying a victory of sorts. 
III. The “pitiful wail” that cut through us
 Hecuba, why the shrill cries you cry? 
Where will your outburst take us? Even from
Inside the tent I heard you keening.
Your pitiful wail sent fear cutting through us,
Right through the hearts of Trojan women
Mourning indoors their day of bondage.
  (Euripides, Trojan Women)
 “Your pitiful wail sent fear cutting through us” says the half-chorus to Hecuba. 
There’s something in a victim’s cry that is both scary and dangerous and one that incites 
fear as Euripides rightly understands. If the cry of the victim is a protest for visibility, 
what is the point of such visibility where “bondage” seems inevitable! What is it that 
victims of torture and humiliation communicate to their oppressors? The memory of a cry 
that cuts through us is the most terrible of all memories. The death-like scream of Pyle 
in Kubrick’s Full-Metal Jacket (1987) when he’s pinned down with a blanket and beaten 
on his belly with bars of soap by the members of the platoon! Pyle had to be taught a les-
son for hiding a jelly doughnut in his foot locker. The drill instructor punishes the entire 
 platoon and that night even Pyle’s friend Joker joins the others in teaching Pyle a lesson 
that not only breaks him down but turns him both suicidal and homicidal. To the end of 
the movie the sniper who turns out to be a young Vietnamese girl is seriously wounded 
and in her death-like pain that comes out in her voice begs to be shot dead. The questions 
we ask about victims of torture are also questions we ask about the torturer and about 
torture too. Is there an ‘x’ element in human nature that comes out in the form of torture? 
229
Prakash kona
Elsass points out that torture comes from the society we live in and therefore has little to 
do with human nature. 
Torture is among the most gruesome of human manifestations, particularly be-
cause it does not have its origin in animals, primitive man, or pre-culture. On 
the contrary, it is planned, and it stems from social order. It is a display of force, 
the aim of which is to break an individual’s judgment. As a consequence, it 
breaks down parts of the victim’s personality. The greatest challenge to the 
torture survivor is therefore to remain a human being under these inhumane 
conditions. (1)
An understanding of torture offers an insight into the social order in which we live. 
The society that produces a torturer or the means of torture ought to share the guilt as a 
whole. A social order where people do not resist what their governments do to others is 
the most dangerous kind of a social order. Indoctrinated to the point where a craving for 
amusement becomes the only reality an individual exists for, such a society is willing to 
tolerate anything that does not come in the way of its amusement. Darren Aronofsky’s Re-
quiem for a Dream (2000) deals with the addiction to illusions and the need to be forever 
on a holiday along with its devastating consequences. As Elsass notes:
Torture gives an insight into some terrifying contradictions. For instance, tor-
turers are not particularly perverse or sadistic: they are often “normal” people. 
Their crime is a consequence of a social order that often has mutual popular 
support. The victims themselves are dehumanized by the crime, inform against 
their friends and families, and admit to crimes they may never have committed. 
All these contradictions are so difficult to sustain that they cause the worst re-
pressions of all—silence and indifference. (1)
When victims “cry,” it is because they protest against the “silence and indifference” 
of the majority in any social order. That is the meaning of the “pitiful wail” of Hecu-
ba. This does not reduce the victim to a creature of innocence that “wails” for lack of 
anything else to do. Speaking of the Jews who were victims under the Nazis, Erica Bouris 
makes the point that “Holocaust theology emphasizes Jewish innocence and purity” (59). 
Such innocence imposed from above is problematic because it stereotypes the victim and 
reduces her/him to a state of passivity. This kind of a reductionism does not speak of those 
who survived the holocaust or bravely resisted it to the point of dying. Bouris adds: 
Holocaust theology takes this identity further; however, it is not merely a self-
-image, but it places this identity at the forefront of Jewish and Israeli politics. 
In other words, for Holocaust theologians, narrating the Holocaust became one 
and the same with crafting the Jewish identity. (59)
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The Jews are neither more nor less innocent than the others which include the Nazis 
as well and the same goes for “Jewish and Israeli politics.” These claims of innocence 
are usually racist assumptions meant to disguise oppression of another kind. The cri-
minal colonization of Palestinian Territories and victimizing of Palestinians who resist 
the occupation is evidence of neither “innocence” nor “vulnerability” on the part of the 
occupiers. The issue here is one of whether there ever was a “simple” victim in history. 
Being “simple” is something we do not expect either from victims or victimizers. We’ve 
to keenly observe and study the social order that creates the categories of victim and 
victimizer. Thus Bouris comes up with the term “complex political victim.” According 
to her, “The complex political victim can be understood as a victim who knowingly and 
purposefully supports certain discourses that contribute to the space of her political vic-
timization” (84).
The role of the victim in the victimization process must be put in perspective. The 
victim accepts the unjust system as natural before she indeed becomes a victim. The mere 
tendency not to speak out against wrongs that happen to others makes one responsible for 
the making of an unjust social order. The “complex political victim” might be a supporter 
of nationalism as an identity “that she values” without cognizing that the other face of 
nationalism could be fascism. In some sense as citizens of a particular state, we’re all 
“complex political victims” in the making by virtue of the fact that we take for granted a 
system based on inequality without raising a voice against it. A social order that permits 
torture, humiliation and the politics of murder, while going on with its daily life, is one 
that has sown the seeds of its own eventual destruction. The failure to “speak” is a moral 
one as much as it is a political one.  
IV. Speak - it is our only hope!
At the end of the movie The Great Dictator the renegade Nazi officer Commander 
Shultz is escaping with the Hitler-look-alike Jewish barber; at the point that the barber is 
mistaken for Hitler and asked to speak, Shultz pleads with the barber: “Speak – it is our 
only hope!” In the speech we see that Chaplin the historic person and Chaplin the perfor-
mer are almost indistinguishable. The anti-Nazi propaganda is obvious and the rhetoric 
does not mince words in those it identifies as enemies of human brotherhood. “Dictators 
free themselves but they enslave the people” says the barber. The enslavement of another 
person as a necessary price for one’s freedom is what makes victimization a discourse of 
power. If it is necessary to examine the social order in order to understand the relation-
ship between victimization and power, at the risk of falling into metaphysics, it is equally 
essential to look at a theory of “human nature” to realize why such power will never go 
unchallenged. 
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Towards the end of the movie Rome, Open City, the drunken Nazi tells his fellow-
-officer: “Twenty-five years ago, I led firing squads in France. I was a young officer then, 
and I thought like you, that we belonged to a superior race, but the French preferred us 
to execute them than tell us anything. We’ll never understand that people want to live 
in freedom.” Tortured and finally killed, the protagonist of the movie refuses to confess 
finally disproving the theory of the Nazi officer that the blood of a German is superior 
to that of an Italian. “I’ve nabbed a man who has to talk before morning. And an Italian 
priest who claims he won’t talk because he’ll pray for him…If he keeps quiet, it would 
mean an Italian is equal to a German, and there’s no difference between the blood of an 
inferior and a superior race. Men are divided in this way.” This is not to romanticize the 
victim as a person with an unbreakable will. On the contrary, Orwell is more than right. 
Torture, the weapon of the strong, almost unfailingly succeeds in breaking individual 
will. History does not offer too many examples of people who could be “normal” fol-
lowing the experience of torture. The cruelty of memory is at its worst in the case of a 
person who has been through a process of dehumanization. Their world-view alters and 
they’re in no mood to be reconciled to the present. 
Yet, every situation where a person is left with no alternative but to fight back is also 
a situation where a person does in fact fight back. The victim who resists does not usually 
fit our image of a victim. Darius Rejali makes the observation that “pain may in fact 
reinforce one’s sense of self during torture” (442). This is why it is hard to torture “hard-
-core revolutionaries” whose mental preparation to endure pain is sometimes greater than 
the torturer’s ability to inflict the pain. Rejali notes that “colonial torturers held that an 
Algerian peasant would be unmoved by tortures that would shatter Europeans, and this 
was why more painful torture was required” (449). The will to assert one’s selfhood in the 
face of humiliation and pain is after all human nature. The will to resist at the expense of 
the breaking body can be as transcending in its determination as the will to power. Says 
Gandhi in the movie version: “They may torture my body, break my bones, even kill me. 
Then they will have my dead body, not my obedience.” Rejali’s point below substantiates 
what Gandhi says about willing to be tortured and killed rather than submit to power.  
…pain is not sufficient to destroy a prisoner’s sense of reality. Several studies of 
torture victims have made this point. For example, in his study of Irish republi-
can prisoners, Allen Feldman shows how Irish republican prisoners harness the 
pain of torture to transform themselves. The Irish paramilitary prisoner exploi-
ted interrogation violence to achieve “self-detachment of his body,” grounded 
himself more firmly in his cause, and moved “from being the object of violence 
to the subject position of the codifying agent,” thereby “emptying it [state vio-
lence] of its ideological content.”…Lastly, some victims describe how brutal 
torture induced in them intense spiritual and mystical states that helped them 
resist their tormentors. (442)
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Following the death of his friend and mentor Karl Marx, Engels in a letter writes 
movingly and with admiration of his revolutionary friend who would have preferred to 
die than to be humiliated by a cruel system – especially a system that he fought and “so 
often annihilated in the prime of his strength.”
Medical skill might have been able to assure him a few more years of vegetative 
existence, the life of a helpless being, dying -- to the triumph of the doctors’ art 
-- not suddenly, but inch by inch. But our Marx would never have borne that. 
To live, with all the unfinished works before him, tantalized by the desire to 
complete them and unable to do so, would have been a thousand times more 
bitter than the gentle death that overtook him. (Engels)
That Marx was a proud man who through his work could impose his indomitable will 
on generations of revolutionaries is one thing; that he died proud as ever preserving his 
dignity as a man and a great revolutionary is another thing. 
In the entire argument I’ve used speech in a specific sense to mean the assertion of 
one’s will in the face of inhuman circumstances more often than not man-made rather 
than “natural.” The rejection of one’s body is the basis of victimization. You cannot be 
a victim unless you are taught to hate your body. Scarry notes: “It is only the prisoner’s 
steadily shrinking ground that wins for the torturer his swelling sense of territory” (36). 
In any other case you may be physically made to suffer but you haven’t given your “obe-
dience.” The moment of psychological submission to the idea of being a victim is what 
makes the victim a reality. Western feminism’s fundamental premise that women in pa-
triarchal societies are indoctrinated into looking down upon their own bodies is an insight 
that is true of other oppressed groups as well. Adrienne Rich thus dedicates her book Of 
Woman Born to her grandmothers Mary Gravely and Hattie Rice “whose lives I begin to 
imagine and to the activists working to free women’s bodies from archaic and unneces-
sary bonds” (“Dedication Page”). The freedom of a woman is a freedom of her body and 
likewise the alienation that women experience in patriarchal societies is to be distanced 
from their bodies. A woman’s life gets reduced to “waiting” which is another word for a 
dreadful kind of passivity without a creative side to it.
When I return to the body of the young woman of twenty-six, pregnant for the 
first time, who fled from the physical knowledge of her pregnancy and at the 
same time from her intellect and vocation, I realize that I was effectively alie-
nated from my real body and my real spirit by the institution – not the fact – of 
motherhood…Women have always been seen as waiting: waiting to be asked, 
waiting for our menses, in fear lest they do or do not come, waiting for men to 
come home from wars, or from work, waiting for children to grow up, or for the 
birth of a new child, or for menopause. (Rich 39)
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The speech I talk about is an articulation of the body as the body fighting for freedom 
from “archaic and unnecessary bonds.” Scarry points out that, “As torture consists of acts 
that magnify the way in which pain destroys a person’s world, self, and voice, so these 
other acts that restore the voice become not only a denunciation of the pain but almost a 
diminution of the pain, a partial reversal of the process of torture itself” (50). There is no 
other body but my own and this is the body through which ‘I’ as the subject invent the 
world in the process of becoming a self. The idealization of the body that we see in popu-
lar Hollywood movies is in fact a dehumanization of the body because it does not have a 
self of its own. A real body is connected to itself as body through a life that can imagine 
both that of others as well as its own. It speaks – the ideal body – but it does so in the 
language of the victimizer. It does not speak the language of the victim. The victim that 
speaks of the situation of the body as body outside the world of ideals is not a victim. He 
or she is a threat to a crumbling system built on false aesthetics and equally false values. 
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